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Introduction 
In the current study, the modern social network 
compositions (SNC) include social networks (S – 
networks) per se, systems of information sharing 
(communication components, C- networks), and tool 
platforms providing the processes of sharing (P-
networks). Generally each component of these socio-
cyber systems has non-trivial characteristics to be in 
focus of many explorers. Following the concept of 
combined stem network [1], we suppose that actors 
from each of P-, C - and S – ensembles, integrated in 
triples - "bouquets". Just for this study there is no 
necessity to consider more than one layer case for the  
P, C and S networks. Thus such actors as a computer 
device, information resource, and individual comprise 
a bouquet of social network composition. Then, in 
graphGq of q components ofsocial network 
composition   
( , )q q qG V E ,   
where  Vq – a set of nodes (vertices), Eq– a set of links 
(edges), and a set of Vq  - includes all participants of 
information sharing processes in the component 
. 
Formal models [2,3] have considered economic 
aspects of information security and have revealed 
features and importance of optimal investment into 
information security. Topological measures to 
mitigate system risks have been stated in [4]. 
Nevertheless, researchers have been faced so far by a 
number of the intricate problems in information 
security of social networking compositions.  
Model of social networking security 
Probabilistic nature of the processes that bring 
damages allows to define risk, R - the main security 
measure - as: 
R P Damage 
 , 
where P - probability of the successful attack, 
Damage - damage caused by impact of an attack.  As 
a classic attack on network structure is focused on 
removal of nodes which is result of coordinated 
threat, one has: 
(1 )tN vN cN N   R = P P P L  
here  Pt N, РvN , 1- PсN  corresponding probabilities 
of threat, vulnerability and overcoming of counter-
measures, LN – cost of topological damage, caused by 
attack on node set  NaЄV.In the proposed model, 
similar to [4], the attacks are revealed through the 
detailed description of triplets – threats, 
vulnerabilities and counter-measures for separate 
nodes. Within the research network structural losses 
L, are estimated by calculations of a portion g of the 
nodes which have been disconnected with giant 
cluster after successful attacks which were carried out 
against targets – nodes:  
1 g L  
In case of emerging threats, with topological features 
close to real, the model gives means to investigate 
network system risks in more complex environment, 
if compare to traditional one. So, if follow [2], the 
probability of a successful attack will be connected 
with the investment in line with  power and 
exponential expressions:  
( ) 1/ ( 1)Ivi i if F F  P  
( 1)
( ) i
FII
vi if F v
  P
 
where v – is initial vulnerability, P vi0  = v for Fi 
=0, and  µ -  a coefficient which sets efficiency of  
financial means. In the study it was suggested that 
probability of a successful attack on  node depends 
only on  Рvi  , which decreases exponentially with 
increasing of  protection barrier "thickness" d. This 
thickness is connected with the value of expenses: d i 
~Fi. In this case: 
)exp()( ii
III
vi FFf  P  
Security level of a separate element of a network 
is defined by the value:  
)exp(1)1( ii FPSL  i  

n
iFF
 
n- is power of a set V.   
It seems reasonable to determine axiomatic 
parameter –security level of a network structure- by 
probability that any of elements won't be successfully 
attacked. If the probability to choose an  attacked 
element i is 1/n  then: 
]/)exp([11  
n
i
n
i nFPSL
 
A specialized generator of network in the Python 
programming language has been created for analyzing 
the network structure exposed to risks.  
Results 
In this paper we study some networks of P-, C-and 
S- character in the field of coordinated  the most 
dangerous threats for complex networks [5]  to 
understand their information security investment 
sensitivity. For this research we have concentrated our 
choice on the following real networks (see Table. 1): 
m is number of links, <k> - average connectivity of 
nodes, γ – degree in a power distribution of node 
connectivity.For the modeling research two protective 
strategies are considered
{ , , }q S I P
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Table 1. Social networks (S), Communication networks (C), and networks of computer platform (P) 
Type Code Name n m <k> γ Reference 
 
P CA CAIDA 26,475 53,381 4.032 ~2 [6]  
P AS Route views 6,474 13,895 4.292 ~2 [6]  
C HA Haggle 274 28,244  206.1 1.5 [7]  
S FB Facebook 63,731 817,035 25.64 ~3 [8]  
S AP Astro Physics 18,772 198,110 21.10 ~3 [6]  
S JZ Jazz musicians 198 2,742  27.70  5.3 [9]  
Strategy 1. All the financing amount of counter-
measures is uniformly distributed on nodes, i.e., in 
simple words, all nodes are protected equally: 
nConstFF ii /111   
Strategy 2. In suggestion that the strategy of security 
governs distribution of financial resources between 
nodes, we have investigated reaction of the networks 
to threats for a case when investment into protection 
of nodes is proportional to their connectivities. The 
total volume of investment into protection is the same, 
as for Strategy 1: 
/2)(2 iii kConstkF   
F 

V
i
ii
V
i
i kFF
11
)(21
 
It was supposed, as before, that the offensive party 
carries out the intentional successive choice of 
targets- nodes with maximum connectivity.P-
components of social network compositions- 
computer networks CAIDA and Route views – both 
have properties of scale-free networks with power 
degree ~ 2, and low value of average connectivity ~ 4. 
We find that removal more than 1 % of nodes causes 
essential damage to these unprotected network 
structures. Dependences of loss L in real P- C-and S- 
networks countering to destruction of 10% nodes are 
presented in Figure 1a. Values of the necessary 
financial volumes of protection measures which are 
uniformly distributed among nodes   ( in 1/µ units ) to 
provide necessary network security level  SL are 
manifested as well. 
 
Figure 1. Loss of failures in  network security (L, 
continuos line)   and expenses on providing of 
protection counter - measures (F, dashed line) at 
different network security level  (SL) according to 
Strategy 1 (a) and  Strategy 2 (b) for the set of 
networks ( Table 1) 
Results of calculations confirm that intentional 
(coordinated) threats of SNC disintegration are 
especially dangerous concerning a computer 
component (CAIDA and Route views networks). Loss 
as functions of security level for social networks FB 
friendships, AP network and JZ has similar behavior. 
Communication network Haggle demonstrates its 
intermediate character. Estimations of topological loss 
and protection costs for the networks with 10% of 
nodes - targets due to distribution of protection 
investment proportional to node degree (Strategy 2) 
are given on Figure 1b. The results indicates that the 
strategy with protection of nodes in proportional 
dependence on connectivity (i.e. F i~ k i)is more 
effective, than the strategy with uniform distribution 
of investment. And it is clear as counter-measures 
reduce probability of inactivation of the nodes 
representing the main targets for the classical strategy 
of coordinated threats. 
 
Conclusion 
We show that among social networking 
components computer networks manifest their 
greatest sensitivities to the most dangerous –
coordinated threats of disintegration. Also it is found 
that network security level with optimal investment 
does not exceed 0.4 ~ 1/e  for both strategies of net-
work protection. 
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